Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in Forfeiture Cases

In a civil asset forfeiture case, the agency seizing property might file a “complaint for forfeiture” in state or federal court. The owner of the property, called the “Claimant,” can challenge the forfeiture by filing a judicial claim, answer, motion to dismiss and/or affirmative defenses.

If the Claimant also has an outstanding arrest warrant related to the accusations that led to the forfeiture, the seizing agency might file a motion to dismiss the Claimant’s filings under the fugitive disentitlement statute.

In federal cases, the fugitive disentitlement statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2466. Under state law in Florida, the fugitive disentitlement statute is Section 896.106, F.S.

When the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is invoked, the Claimant might respond by showing they are not a “fugitive” because they are not refusing to surrender to the Court but instead are temporarily unable to surrender on the warrant because of factors outside of their control.

For example, a foreign national living overseas might be unable to get a travel visa necessary to enter the United States legally. Sometimes, the government might agree to file for a parolee visa on their behalf.

The Claimant might request a stay until they can travel to the United States and voluntarily surrender in the criminal case. The motion to dismiss their claim on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not be granted if they can show they are not deliberately avoiding criminal prosecution by leaving the United States, declining to enter or reenter the country, or otherwise evading the criminal court’s jurisdiction.

Additionally, the Claimant might file a response asking the court to use its discretion to deny the motion to strike the claim because:

1. the evidence for forfeiture is weak;
2. the seizing agency’s theory as to the asset does not appear to be well-founded;
3. the seizing agency is acting in bad faith or overreaching;
4. the court lacks jurisdiction over the assets because neither the asset nor the claimant had any ties to the court’s jurisdiction;
5. the court has no control or constructive control over the property at issue in the civil forfeiture action;
6. the court would be violating the constitutional requirements of in rem jurisdiction;
7. the in rem judgment would violate the redressability doctrine;
8. the action violated the general-law rules of personal jurisdiction;
9. the fugitive disentitlement statute violates due process; or
10. the fugitive disentitlement statute does not apply to this particular Claimant.

The courts have found that it may be appropriate to consider the merits of the civil forfeiture case in determining whether to apply the disentitlement doctrine when there is evidence that the Government is overreaching or that the criminal charges were brought for the purpose of bolstering a related civil forfeiture case, see 146 Cong. Rec. S1753-02, *S1761 (March 27, 2000) (Senator Leahy) (“Opponents of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine say that the prosecutors have gone so far as to indict people whom they know will never return to this country, so that they can invoke the doctrine in civil forfeiture proceedings against such persons’ U.S. assets.”).

In United States v. Nasri, 119 F.4th 1172, 1178-1179 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s exercise of in rem jurisdiction without a finding that it has control or constructive control over the defendant property violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

In United States v. Krishnan’s Real and Personal Praperty, 2020 WL 3510688, *11-12 (E.D.N.C. Jun. 29, 2020), the court found it had a duty to exercise its discretion and decline to grant a motion to strike under § 2466 if the Government’s civil forfeiture case appears weak. It granted the motion to strike as to all assets but one. It held that because the Government’s money laundering forfeiture theory as to that asset does not appear to be well-founded, the motion should be denied as to that asset, and the civil case stayed under § 981(g)(2).

In United States v. Real Property Known as 3678 Waynesville Road, 2007 WL 1982780, *4 (S.D. Ohio 2007), the court denied the Government’s motion under § 2466 for lack of evidence that the claimant was aware of the warrant for his arrest, even though his attorney was aware of the warrant. That proof was not sufficient without evidence that the attorney passed the information on to the Claimant.

In United States v. $6,976,934.65 Plus Interest, 554 F.3d 123, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the court found that “mere notice or knowledge of an outstanding warrant, coupled with refusal to enter the United States, does not satisfy the statute. The alleged fugitive must have declined to enter or reenter the country in order to avoid prosecution.”

In United States v. Salti, 579 F.3d 656, 665-66 (6th Cir. 2009), the claimant’s assertion that he declined to enter the U.S. for health reasons, if true, would be a valid defense. The burden is on the Government to prove that the reason he declined to enter the U.S. was to avoid prosecution.

In United States v. Balm, 2011 WL 4708799, *9 (W.D. Tenn. June 27, 2011), the court refused to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to a motion filed by a corporation controlled by a fugitive defendant because the Government could not show defendant’s reason for remaining in Vanuatu for nine years was to avoid prosecution.

History of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The federal version of the “Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine” began under the common law as a way for the courts “to dismiss appeals in criminal cases by defendants who had escaped custody after filing the appeal and were evading the jurisdiction of the court.” United States v. $6,976,934.65 (“Soulbury II“), 554 F.3d 123, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

In civil forfeiture actions, some courts applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to “dismiss a claim based on the fugitive’s evasion of a related, but separate, criminal proceeding.” Id.

In Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996), the Supreme Court determined that the use of fugitive disentitlement doctrine in civil matters was not permissible “[a]s a court-made rule.” Soulbury II, 554 F.3d at 127. In response, Congress enacted the fugitive disentitlement statute as part of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (“CAFRA”), see Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2001), which states, in relevant part:

(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the resources of the courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture action upon a finding that such person–

(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has been issued for his apprehension, in order to avoid criminal prosecution–

(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United States;

(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction; or

(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal case is pending against the person; and

(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction for commission of criminal conduct in that jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 2466.

Under the fugitive disentitlement statute, “Congress specifically conferred statutory authority on federal courts to order disentitlement in civil forfeiture cases.” Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 198 (2d Cir. 2004).

A person might have no other reason to come to the United States other than to defend against criminal charges. Yet, through no fault of their own, they are unable to immediately make the trip because of factors outside of their control.

Procedures for Adjudicating Motions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2466

Section 2466 does not contain its own procedural standards. Instead, the courts often treat the motion like a motion to dismiss. The Courts sometimes look at matters outside the pleadings. In some cases, the courts have treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment. See United States v. $6,976,934.65 (“Soulbury I“), 478 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2007).

When considering a motion to dismiss under the fugitive disentitlement statute, the Ninth Circuit has considered a five-part test that tracks § 2466’s statutory requirements:

1. a warrant or similar process was issued in a criminal case for the claimant’s apprehension;
2. the claimant had notice or knowledge of the warrant or process;
3. the criminal case is related to the forfeiture action;
4. the claimant is not confined or otherwise held in custody in another jurisdiction; and
5. the claimant has deliberately avoided criminal prosecution by leaving the United States, declining to enter or reenter the country, or otherwise evading the criminal court’s jurisdiction.

Soulbury II, 554 F.3d at 128.

A finding that a claimant is a fugitive requires a finding that the claimant possessed the specific “intent to avoid criminal prosecution,” which is to say that the fugitive’s “evasion must have been ‘in order to avoid criminal prosecution.”‘ See Soulbury II, 554 F.3d at 132-33 (quoting id. § 2466(a)(1)).

Significantly, CAFRA does not mandate disentitlement when its requirements are satisfied; rather, the act is couched in permissive terms that a court “may disallow” a fugitive from invoking federal judicial resources under those circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2466; see also Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 198 (2nd Cir. 2004) (Section 2466 “does not mandate disentitlement; the ultimate decision whether to order disentitlement in a particular case rests in the sound discretion of the district court”).

Cases in Which the Court Refused to Invoke the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The courts must complete a two-step analysis to determine whether a defendant is a fugitive who may be disentitled from relief in court. First, the court must decide whether the defendant is, in fact, a fugitive. If so, the court has discretion to disentitle the fugitive only if doing so would serve the fugitive disentitlement doctrine’s objectives.

The following federal cases reflect instances where the court refused the government’s request to invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine:

• United States v. Leach, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2702, *3-4, 2026 LX 88301, 2026 WL 44849 (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, January 7, Jan 2026)
  • “Before turning to the merits of the motion, the Court must briefly address the government’s invocation of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, under which “a court may decline to entertain the claims of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice.” United States v. Bescond, 24 F.4th 759, 764 (2d Cir. 2021). Leach and Knowles are not “traditional fugitives” because they did not “flee[] from the jurisdiction of the court where a crime was committed or depart[] from [their] usual place of abode and conceal[ themselves] within the district.” Id. at 771 (cleaned up). They are not “constructive-flight fugitives” because, as residents of Belize, they did not just happen to be there and then “refuse[] to return to the United [*4] States in order to avoid prosecution.” Id. at 772 (cleaned up). Even if their status were a close call, the Court would still decline to rely on the doctrine because, as the Second Circuit has noted, incautiously labeling a foreign defendant a fugitive “is in tension with principles that underlie the presumption against extraterritorial[ application of United States law].” Id.; see also id. at 773 (noting that use of the doctrine is discretionary). Since extraterritoriality is at the heart of defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court will address it on the merits.
• Teman v. Zeldes Needle Cooper LLP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269005, *8, 2025 LX 629197, 2025 WL 3778680 (New York Southern District Court, December 31, 2025)
  • Under the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine, the Court may exercise its discretion to bar “fugitives” from judicial relief. See Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 795 (2d Cir. 2006). However, the instant case lacks the “expressly require[ed] nexus between fugitivity and the course of the [] proceedings.” Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1997). For this reason, the Court will continue proceedings in this case.
• In the following two cases, the court declined to address the fugitive disentitlement doctrine where a defendant’s motion failed on the merits
  • United States v. Westbrook, No. 2:23-CR-00779, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214028, 2025 WL 3034055, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2025).
  • United States v. Ross, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263395, *7, 2025 LX 531557, 2025 WL 3707314 (Pennsylvania Middle District Court, December 22, 2025).

• In United States v. Westbrook, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214028, *4, 2025 LX 438714, 2025 WL 3034055 (New Jersey District Court, October 30, 2025), the court rejected the Government’s invocation of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to deny the defendant’s request after noting:
  • “that there is some divergence of authority regarding whether a foreigner who was not in the United States at the time of the indictment and who has few connections to this country may be declared a fugitive merely by remaining in his own country. Compare United States v. Martirossian, 917 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that the District Court’s application of fugitive disentitlement doctrine on such facts did not warrant mandamus) and United States v. Shaloub, 588 F.3d 1255, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2017) (same) with United States v. Bescond, 7 F.4th 127, 139-41 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that French citizen living in France who did not report to U.S. following indictment was not a fugitive) and In re Hijazi, 589 F.3d 401, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not apply to a defendant who “did not flee from the jurisdiction or from any restraints placed upon him”). I need not wade into the dispute because application of “the fugitive disentitlement doctrine [is] discretionary,” Galeas Figueroa v. Attorney General United States, 998 F.3d 77, 84-86 (3d Cir. 2021), and, given my rulings in the Government’s favor on the other issues, I exercise that discretion not to apply the doctrine.

• Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 956. (7th Circuit, 2006): The court declined to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine because the petitioner, who had failed to report for removal, turned himself in voluntarily upon learning he was wanted. The court emphasized that the petitioner was no longer a fugitive and noted that courts are generally reluctant to impose the severe sanction of disentitlement in such circumstances.

• United States v. Khoury, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97181. (Southern District of Texas, 2018): The court refused to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to a defendant residing in a country from which he could not be extradited. The court noted that the defendant had not absconded from custody and that merely residing in another country does not make one a fugitive.

Florida’s Fugitive Disentitlement Statute in Section 896.106

Florida’s Fugitive Disentitlement Statute, found in Section 896.106, provides:

A person may not use the resources of the courts of this state in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action or a claim in a third-party proceeding in any related forfeiture action if that person purposely leaves the jurisdiction of this state or the United States; declines to enter or reenter this state to submit to its jurisdiction; or otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal case is pending against the person.

Section 896.106 uses the term “purposely” when describing whether the person leaves the jurisdiction, declines to enter or renter this state, or otherwise evades the jurisdiction. If those actions were not done “purposely,” then the FDD would not apply.

What is the Difference Between the Federal and Florida Version of the FDD?

The federal and Florida versions of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine share similarities in their purpose and application but differ in their statutory language, scope, and certain procedural nuances.

The federal version of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is codified in 28 USCS § 2466. It allows a judicial officer to disallow a person from using the resources of U.S. courts in civil forfeiture or related criminal forfeiture actions if the person, after notice or knowledge of a warrant or process for their apprehension, purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United States, declines to enter or reenter the United States, or otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court where a criminal case is pending. This applies only if the person is not confined or held in custody in another jurisdiction for criminal conduct . 28 USCS § 2466.

Florida’s version, codified in , Fla. Stat. § 896.106, also prohibits a person from using the resources of Florida courts in related civil forfeiture or third-party proceedings if the person purposely leaves the jurisdiction of Florida or the United States, declines to enter or reenter Florida, or otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court where a criminal case is pending. Fla. Stat. § 896.106.

Unlike the federal statute, the Florida version does not explicitly include the condition that the person must not be confined or held in custody in another jurisdiction.

The federal statute explicitly extends its application to claims filed by corporations if a majority shareholder or an individual filing on behalf of the corporation meets the criteria for disentitlement under subsection (a). 28 USCS § 2466. The Florida statute does not explicitly address corporate claims or their disentitlement.

Both versions are grounded in the principles of equity and judicial discretion. The federal doctrine, as interpreted by courts, emphasizes the necessity of a sufficient connection between the fugitive status and the claim being pursued, as well as the need to effectuate the concerns underlying the doctrine, such as preventing fugitives from benefiting from the judicial system while evading its authority .

Florida courts have similarly recognized the doctrine’s equitable nature, applying it to civil forfeiture cases arising from criminal charges, provided there is a connection between the fugitive status and the claim .

The U.S. Supreme Court in Degen v. United States held that federal courts do not have inherent authority to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to enter summary judgment in civil forfeiture cases, requiring statutory authority for such actions.
United States v. 6,190.00 in United States Currency, 581 F.3d 881, Tejada v. 406,626.11 in United States Currency, 820 So. 2d 385.

Florida courts have upheld the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. § 896.106. finding that it does not violate due process when applied under proper authority. Tejada v. 406,626.11 in United States Currency, 820 So. 2d 385.

The federal statute includes a specific limitation that disentitlement applies only if the individual is not confined or held in custody in another jurisdiction for criminal conduct. 28 USCS § 2466. This limitation is absent in the Florida statute, potentially allowing for broader application in Florida courts. Fla. Stat. § 896.106.

The federal statute explicitly addresses corporate claims, while the Florida statute does not. 28 USCS § 2466, Fla. Stat. § 896.106.

While both the federal and Florida versions of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine aim to prevent fugitives from exploiting the judicial system, the federal statute includes additional limitations and explicitly addresses corporate claims, whereas the Florida statute is broader in scope and does not include those same limitations. Both versions, however, are subject to equitable considerations and constitutional scrutiny in their application.

This article was last updated on Tuesday, January 13, 2026.