Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

Under Florida law, the term “reasonable articulable suspicion” relies on the officers ability to articulate facts observed by the officer, the surrounding circumstances, and how those facts and circumstances are reasonably interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge and experience.

In many cases, the criminal defense attorney must first determine whether reasonable, articulable suspicion supports the investigatory stop. Next, the criminal defense attorney must determine whether probable cause supports any search and seizure. If either are lacking, the criminal defense attorney will file a motion to suppress that evidence illegally seized and all evidence tainted from that initial illegality.

Your attorney must understand the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, and the standard needed for the particular action taken by law enforcement. Under some circumstances, reasonable suspicion might be necessary for an investigatory stop, but probable cause is necessary before a law enforcement officer may take the next step and search a person, home, office, or vehicle (and the containers within that location).

For a search to be legally justified under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 12, the officer must have probable cause to believe that “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in the car. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).

The Florida Constitution contains its own provision protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures. Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. provides in part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . shall not be violated.”). That provision also contains a conformity clause, which provides: “This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Thus, Florida courts “are bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with relation to the fourth amendment.” Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988).

Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law is found in Section 901.151, Florida Statute. It uses the reasonable suspicion standard for temporarily detentions for the “purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding the person’s presence abroad which led the officer to believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.” That detention may only continue long enough to effect the purposes of making that determination. And the temporary detention may not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or “the immediate vicinity thereof.”

When the officer makes such a detention without reasonable suspicion, it might result in evidence being illegally gathered. By filing the motion to suppress when reasonable articulable suspicion is lacking, the court must suppress that evidence so it cannot be used at trial. After that evidence is suppressed, it might result in the entire criminal case being dismissed entirely, or reduced to a less serious charge. Even if the case is not dropped completely, the suppression of evidence might greatly increases the chances of the jury returning a “not guilty” verdict.

Attorney on “Reasonable Articulable Suspicion” in Florida

If you are under investigation or charged with a crime, contact an experienced criminal defense attorney at Sammis Law Firm to find out more about unique legal defenses that might exist in your case. Experienced attorneys can often spot issues that others might miss. Those issue often lead to better result including the total dismissal of the case, reduced charges, or significantly better outcomes.

The attorneys at Sammis Law Firm are experienced in filing and litigating motions to suppress evidence illegally gathered or seized. Spotting those issues often requires a good understanding of reasonable articulable suspicion, probable cause, and when each is needed. We understand the important protections provided by Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. We use that knowledge to determine when an officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and probable cause to conduct a search or seizure.

At Sammis Law Firm, we have offices conveniently located in Tampa in Hillsborough County, Clearwater in Pinellas County, and New Port Richey in Pasco County. Contact us for a confidential consultation to discuss your case, and how to fight for the best possible result.

Call 813-250-0500.

Reasonable Articulable Suspicion for an Investigatory Stop

For a law enforcement officer’s investigatory stop to be lawful, the officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Musallam v. State, 133 So. 3d 568, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). A reasonable suspicion “has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge.” State v. Zachery, 255 So. 3d 957, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (quoting Bailey v. State, 717 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)).

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court of the United States considered the “facts available to the officer” when determining whether an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. In Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014), the United States Supreme Court explained that reasonable suspicion is “dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.”

The reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion turns on the totality of the circumstances and necessarily accounts for both the facts and circumstances that led to the officer’s suspicion, as well as the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. Mackey v. State, 124 So. 3d 176, 183 (Fla. 2013). Behavior that could have an innocent explanation can still provide the basis for reasonable suspicion because a reasonable degree of suspicion rationally attaches to certain types of noncriminal acts. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989). Ultimately, that the suspect might have an innocent explanation does not render an officer’s suspicion unreasonable if the suspicion arose from circumstances that a reasonable law enforcement officer would find suspicious. State v. J.C., 292 So. 3d 30, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). Instead, reasonable suspicion “can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause,” and it can arise from information that is less reliable than what is required to show probable cause. Id. As a result, “police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421, 425 (Fla. 2014) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989)).

In California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991), the United States Supreme Court found that “[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” Probable cause is viewed from the perspective of a police officer with specialized training. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Probable cause focuses on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons—not legal technicians—act. Id.

Read more about Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law found in Section 901.151, F.S.

When Potentially Lawful Conduct Gives Rise to Reasonable Suspicion

The United States Supreme Court has construed the Fourth Amendment so that an officer need not rule out the possibility of a lawful explanation for an officer to have reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002).

For instance, in Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, the U.S. Supreme Court found that “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). No such legal rules strictly apply because officers must be empowered to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 377, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 206 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2020) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000)).

In Glover, a law enforcement officer ran a license plate check on a vehicle and learned Mr. Glover’s driver’s license had been revoked. Id. at 379. The officer assumed Mr. Glover was driving before conducting an investigatory stop, confirmed that Mr. Glover was the driver, and arrested him. Id. Mr. Glover’s criminal defense attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered after the stop arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because the officer could not have known that Mr. Glover was the driver before pulling the vehicle over. Id. at 378.

The Supreme Court held that the officer had a “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing based on the information gained from the tag check. Id. at 380. While the officer could not have known with certainty that Mr. Glover was actually the one driving until after he was pulled over, it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that the owner of a car is the one driving the car. Id. at 381. The Court reasoned that law enforcement officers must be permitted to rely on probabilities and they must be empowered to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Id. at 380-81.

The United States Supreme Court has “consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’ ” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277).

The Objective “Totality of the Circumstances” Analysis

The “totality of the circumstances” analysis is an objective one. “[A] determination of reasonable, articulable suspicion is to be based on ‘commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.'” Mackey v. State, 124 So. 3d 176, 183 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).

In Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124, 1128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the opinion acknowledged that a court is not necessarily bound by the officer’s subjective intent or motivation on the issue of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but rather the court must apply an objective standard to determine the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. “[E]ven conduct consistent with innocent activity can give rise to a reasonable suspicion in support of a Terry-stop when all the circumstances are taken into consideration.” State v. Cruse, 121 So. 3d 91, 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

“Thus, the police officer’s suspicions need not be inconsistent with a hypothesis of innocence. Rather, they need to be based only on rational inferences, from articulable facts, which reasonably suggest criminal activity.” State v. Johnson, 516 So. 2d 1015, 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

In R.A. v. State, 355 So. 3d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023), the court reasoned that “[w]hether a suspicion is ‘reasonable’ will depend on the existence of ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).

“In determining whether a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of a police officer’s experience and background.” State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.'” State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989)).

When Can you Walk or Run Away from a Law Enforcement Officer in Florida?

After being accused of a crime, the criminal defense attorney might file a motion to suppress evidence found after the accused walk or runs away from a law enforcement officer by arguing there was no articulable suspicion for the stop, so the accused had the legal right to walk (or run) away from the officer.

As a general rule, when a law enforcement officer began approaching a person to speak with them, the encounter might be classified as “merely a consensual encounter” which does not implicate the Fourth Amendment which means the person is within their rights to walk away.

In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991), Florida case law makes it clear “that a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.” (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)).

In State v. Reyes, 4 So. 3d 46, 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), the court explained that a consensual encounter involves minimal police contact during which a citizen may either comply with an officer’s requests or ignore them, and which do not invoke constitutional safeguards. “Where an officer has no basis to detain an individual, the individual’s action in ignoring an officer’s command to stop cannot constitute resisting arrest.” F.B. v. State, 605 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

In R.R. v. State, 137 So. 3d 535, 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), the court found an officer’s command to stop was a lawful execution of a legal duty, but only because there was reasonable suspicion to support the stop.” (quoting Palmer v. State, 112 So. 3d 606, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

In the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause to arrest, an individual asked questions by an officer “has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.” Fields v. State, 292 So. 3d 889, 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting T.P. v. State, 224 So. 3d 792, 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

In Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 195 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court found that during “a consensual encounter, an individual is free to leave at any time and may choose to ignore the officer’s requests and go about his business.”

This article was last updated on Friday, April 10, 2026.