Extradition Fugitive Warrant – Case Results

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• The Florida Bar does not approve or routinely review case results posted by attorneys.
• The facts and circumstances of your case may differ from the facts and circumstances discussed here.
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• The case results discussed here do not necessarily represent the results obtained in all cases.
• Each case is different and must be evaluated and handled on its merit.

Out-of-State Fugitive Warrant Cae Dismissed in Hillsborough County – November 3, 2024

Assigned Attorney: Leslie Sammis

Our client was arrested at his home in Hillsborough County, FL, on an out-of-state fugitive warrant on October 28, 2024. We were retained the next day, right before the 1:30 p.m. first appearance hearing. Although most people are held in jail with “no bond” while awaiting extradition, we convinced the court that an extradition bond was appropriate. We also argued that the criminal report affidavit (CRA) lacked probable cause because it contained no description of any facts explaining why our client was the same person identified in the out-of-state warrant. Nothing in the CRA disclosed what the out-of-state charges were or when they were allegedly committed. That day, the court agreed to ROR our client with a private GPS monitor and asked us to return to court in two days when more information might be available. During that time, we contacted the out-of-state prosecutor and got them to agree that our client could “self-surrender” the following week. When we returned to court in Hillsborough County on October 31, 2024, the state had no objection to that arrangement. On November 1, 2024, the Honorable J. Logan Murphy entered an “Order of Release,” which provided:

Because the information necessary to place conditions of release on Defendant …. after examination in this fugitive case has not been presented to the Court, Defendant …shall be RELEASED and all conditions of release (including a private GPS and any restrictions on travel) shall be LIFTED. ss. 941.13, 941.14, 941.15, Fla. Stat. (2024); France v. Judd, 932 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

This order does not dismiss this fugitive case, which shall remain open. The Court will enter a more detailed order addressing all of [Defendant’s] pending charges and the future progress of this case. See Carter v. Coleman, 443 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (“[A] discharge from bond or custody does not mean dismissal of all extradition proceedings.”).

Read more about extradition warrants in Florida.

On November 3, the court entered a more detailed order of release that dismissed the case entirely. The Order provided:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

CRIMINAL DIVISION

STATE OF FLORIDA

v.

…. TURNER.

_______________________________________________________/

ORDER OF RELEASE AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE

… Turner was arrested on October 28, 2024. According to the criminal report affidavit executed by the arresting officer, he was “identified [by his driver’s license] as being the same person listed in” New York warrant NY03….. for grand larceny. The New York warrant has not been filed (or provided to defense counsel), nor is there any indication that Turner has been indicted in New York. His attorney filed a motion to set bond and appeared for a hearing on October 29, 2024.

At that hearing, I ordered Turner to be released on his own recognizance with a GPS monitor until a proper examination could be conducted concerning the New York warrant. At the status review on October 31, no additional information was provided by the State concerning the warrant, nor did any witness appear to testify about the warrant or the New York charges. I therefore ordered Turner released so that he could turn himself into New York authorities next week. This written order follows to explain the release.

FUGITIVE PROCEDURE

In 1941, Florida adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, now codified in part 1 of chapter 941 of the Florida Statutes. See §§ 941.01–941.30, Fla. Stat. (2024). “The Act facilitates provisions of the United States Constitution and federal implementing legislation that provide for the extradition of fugitives from state to state, upon one governor’s demand to another.” France v. Judd, 932 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, U.S. Const.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182, 3194, 3195; § 941.02. Fla. Stat. (2005)).

There are a number of procedural requirements before a governor’s demand for extradition may be executed through what’s known as a “governor’s warrant.” See generally id. at 1264–65. But this case involves provisions of chapter 941 that allow the arrest and detention of an accused fugitive before the issuance of a governor’s warrant—known as a “pre-requisition arrest.” There are two situations in which this is permitted.

The first is governed by § 941.13. Under that provision, a judge may order a fugitive to be arrested under a “fugitive warrant.” The judge may issue a fugitive warrant in two scenarios. First, a “credible person” must “charge before a Florida judge that a person in Florida either (1) has committed a crime in another state and has fled from justice, or (2) has been convicted of a crime in another state and has escaped from confinement or broken the terms of her bail, probation, or parole.” France, 932 So. 2d at 1265.

Second, a “credible person” from the demanding state submits an affidavit to the Florida judge “attesting either (1) that a crime has been committed in that state, that the accused has been charged with committing the crime, and that the accused has fled from justice,” or (2) “that the accused has been convicted of a crime in that state and has escaped from confinement or broken the terms of her bail, probation, or parole, and is believed to be in Florida.” France, 932 So. 2d at 1265.

Because there is no indication that Turner has been convicted in New York, the second method does not apply. So, under the first method, “[a]ll that is required is that a credible person charge under oath before a Florida judge that the person committed a crime in the demanding state and has fled.” France, 932 So. 2d 1265. Under the Second District’s controlling interpretation of § 941.13, this charge is equivalent to “a direct showing of probable cause” or proof that there has been a judicial determination of probable cause in the demanding state. France, 932 So. 2d 1265.

Here, neither I nor any other judge in Hillsborough County has executed, or been asked to execute, a warrant under § 941.13. When a pre-arrest warrant has not been executed, § 941.14 applies. Warrantless pre-requisition arrests are allowed “(1) based on ‘reasonable information’ that (2) the person ‘stands charged in the courts of a state’ with (3) ‘a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year.’” France, 932 So. 2d at 1265 (quoting § 941.14). If a fugitive is arrested without a warrant, he “must be taken before a judge with all practicable speed and complaint must be made against [him] under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest as in [§ 941.13]; and thereafter his or her answer shall be heard as if the accused had been arrested on a warrant.” § 941.14. “In other words, as soon as practicable after a warrantless arrest, the probable cause requirements for obtaining a fugitive warrant under section 941.13 must be established.” France, 932 So. 2d at 1266.

No matter how the pre-requisition arrest occurs, § 941.15 requires the Florida judge to perform “an examination” to determine whether “it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and . . . that the person has fled from justice . . . .” § 941.15. If so, the Florida judge must issue a warrant reciting the accusations and commit the fugitive to the county jail for a period not to exceed 30 days (which can be extended an additional 60 days), pending arrest on a governor’s warrant. See § 941.15, 941.17; France, 932 So. 2d at 1266.

A couple of other provisions are noteworthy. First, Florida judges may admit fugitives to bail unless “the offense with which the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed.” § 941.16. The judge may require all sureties necessary to ensure the fugitive’s appearance at a future date and time for the fugitive’s surrender or to be arrested on a governor’s warrant. § 941.16. Bail is not required, however, and “the judiciary is given wide discretion to decide whether to hold a fugitive in custody without bail.” Vargas v. Junior, 254 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

Second, if the fugitive is not arrested on a governor’s warrant within the time provided by statute, the Florida court may “dismiss its own court proceedings and discharge the fugitive warrant and bail bond which it had issued therein.” Carter v. Coleman, 443 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). But that does not mean that all extradition proceedings are barred or dismissed.

The fugitive may still be arrested on a governor’s warrant after that point, but the Florida court cannot hold him or place him under any conditions of release. The discharge to which he is entitled is akin to a release following a finding of no probable cause after a warrantless arrest. See Griglen v. Ryan, 138 So. 3d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding that a release following a finding of no probable cause where formal charges have not been filed “is a recognition that the defendant should not be in custody or on any form of pretrial release or supervision” and “place[s] the defendant in the same position (from a custodial, liberty and supervisory standpoint) he was in prior to his arrest”).

APPLICATION TO THIS CASE

The only evidence is the criminal report affidavit from October 28. According to the CRA, Turner was identified by his Florida driver’s license as being the same person listed in New York warrant NY030….. In an effort to comply with § 941.14, the CRA recited: The charge(s) listed on the out-of-state warrant is/are LARCENY – GRAND LARCENY 3. The defendant fled the jurisdiction of the issuing Agency/State NYPD/New York. The defendant is charged with a crime that is punishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year. The warrant was confirmed by HCSO operator # 32. Doc. 7.

On those grounds, Turner was arrested and brought before me for a first appearance. During that proceeding, his attorney argued that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the pre-requisition warrantless arrest under § 941.14. I agree. As in France, the CRA “did not disclose how the deputy who arrested [Turner] came to learn that [he] was wanted in [New York].” France, 932 So. 2d at 1267. There were no details about the source of the information. It seems that information may have come through “HCSO operator # 32,” but we do not know who that is or how that operator secured the information to confirm the warrant.

Admittedly, the CRA in this case provides more detail than the affidavits in France. For example, the CRA here identifies the crime (grand larceny) and alleges it is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year. The affidavits at issue in France “said nothing about whether the offenses were punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . .” France, 932 So. 2d at 1267. Still, the CRA from Turner’s arrest provides no detail about the source of the warrant information, meaning that under France, it does not provide “reasonable information” that he stands accused of a felony in New York. § 941.14. Even if it did provide “reasonable information” to warrant his arrest, § 941.13 has not been satisfied here. Under that statute, a “credible person” must charge “under oath before a Florida judge” that the person committed a crime in the demanding state and has fled.” France, 932 So. 2d at 1265.

Because there is no detail in the CRA concerning where the arresting officer obtained his information, he does not qualify as a “credible person” for the purpose of this statute. See France, 932 So. 2d at 1268 (“Although the arrest affidavits were sworn, at most they merely attested that the arresting deputy had received hearsay information from an unspecified source that a person with the same name as France, and with the same date of birth or other similar characteristics, was wanted for the commission of a crime in another state. In other words, the deputy was a recipient of information and not the source of credible information. Thus, none of the affidavits constituted a charge on the oath of a credible person . . . .”).

Moreover, the CRA lacks the detail required for a “direct showing of probable cause” required by § 941.13 and Florida law. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–16 (1964) (holding affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause when it failed to inform the magistrate of the underlying circumstances on which the affiant reached his conclusion) Goesel v. State, 305 So. 3d 821, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (holding “conclusory statements are insufficient to support” probable cause because “‘sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (emphasis added in Goesel))); Burnett v. State, 848 So. 2d 1170, 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[W]holly conclusory statements fail to meet the probable cause requirement; the reviewing magistrate cannot abdicate his or her duty and become a mere ratifier of the bare conclusions of others.”).

And even if the arrest prerequisites in sections 941.13 and 941.14 were met, the examination I conducted in open court did not demonstrate that Turner may be held or admitted to bail. Turner denied that he is charged with a crime in New York or that he fled, and the State did not produce any evidence showing otherwise. See § 941.15 (“If from the examination before the judge it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and . . . that the person has fled from justice . . . .”).

Because the procedural safeguards of sections 941.13 and 941.14 are not satisfied, and because the examination required by section 941.15 did not show that Turner is the person charged with a crime, Turner cannot be held, admitted to bond, or placed on any form of conditional release. See Griglen, 138 So. 3d at 1173; Carter, 443 So. 2d at 493. This does not mean, however, that he cannot be arrested on a Governor’s warrant from New York. (Though this appears to be academic at this point, given his attorney’s representation that he intends to present himself to New York authorities to satisfy any questions concerning an outstanding warrant.) It also does not mean that he could not be arrested again in Florida upon reasonable information from a credible person that he has a felony warrant outstanding in New York. It simply means that the court’s inquiry and supervision for this particular arrest has ended.

Given this result, I believe the best procedure is to enter a release, discharge Turner from custody and all restrictions on liberty, and close the 13th Circuit fugitive warrant case against him. This closure is not an adjudication on the merits in any way—Turner can still be arrested on a governor’s warrant, rearrested pre-requisition upon a court-issued warrant under § 941.13, or rearrested pre-requisition without a warrant if the requirements of § 941.14 are met. But for our purposes, case number 24-CF-017… should be closed (effectively a dismissal without prejudice). The State has the right to reopen the case if it seeks to present credible information that would allow me to issue a warrant or hold Turner pending service of a governor’s warrant.

Accordingly,

1. Turner is RELEASED and DISCHARGED from custody.
2. All non-monetary conditions of release previously imposed are LIFTED.
3. Defendant’s Motion to Modify Conditions of Pre-Trial Release is GRANTED.
4. Defendant’s Motion for Set Bond is DENIED without prejudice as moot.
5. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice and the Clerk shall CLOSE the file.
6. Any party may move to reopen the case upon a showing consistent with this order.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2024.

J. Logan Murphy

Circuit Judge